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Abstract This article examines the impact of cata-
strophic hurricane events on income distribution in hurri-
cane states in the United States. Media claims have been
made and the perception created that the most damaging
impact of hurricanes is on the lowest income population in
the affected states. If these claims are true, they may have
serious implications for the insurance industry and gov-
ernment policy makers. We develop a panel data, fixed
effects econometric model that includes hurricane-impac-
ted states as cross-sections using annual data for a period of
almost 100 years. The Gini coefficient is used as a measure
of income inequality, and is a function of normalized
hurricane economic damages, gross domestic product
(GDP), a set of socioeconomic variables that serves as a
control, time trend, and cross-sectional dummy variables.
Findings indicate that for every 100 billion US dollars in
hurricane economic damages there is an increase in income
inequality by 5.4 % as measured by Gini coefficient.
Political, sociodemographic, and economic variables are
also significant. These include such variables as the polit-
ical party controlling the U.S. Senate, the proportion of
nonwhite population by state, and GDP. Time trend is a
positive and significant variable, suggesting an increase in
income inequality over time. There are significant differ-
ences among the states included in the study. Our results
demonstrate that different segments of the population are
differently impacted by hurricanes and suggest how that
differential impact could be considered in future govern-
ment policies and business decisions, particularly those
made by the insurance industry.
Keywords Hurricane damages  Income
distribution  Disaster insurance  United States
1 Introduction
The economics literature demonstrates that although richer
nations do not experience fewer natural disasters than
poorer nations, richer nations do suffer less death and long-
term property damages from disaster (Kahn 2005; Toya
and Skidmore 2007). Therefore economic development
provides implicit insurance against nature’s shocks.
Nations with higher-quality and more robust institutions
suffer less death and long-term property damages from
natural disasters. A disproportionate share of the deaths
caused by such environmental shocks as earthquakes,
floods, cyclones, hurricanes, and extreme temperature
events are borne by people in developing countries. The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Vellinga and
Mills 2001) reports that 65 % of world deaths from natural
disasters between 1985 and 1999 took place in nations
whose incomes were below USD 760 per capita. ‘‘Ninety
percent of the disaster victims worldwide live in develop-
ing countries where poverty and population pressures force
growing numbers of poor people to live in harm’s way on
flood plains, in earthquake prone zones and on unstable
hillsides. Unsafe buildings compound the risks. The vul-
nerability of those living in risk prone areas is perhaps the
single most important cause of disaster casualties and
damage’’ (Annan 1999). Although this view is widely
accepted as factual, there are some studies that indicate that
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behavioral changes at the micro level in response to
increasing income (such as location choice and extent of
costly abatement activity) may lead to a nonlinear rela-
tionship between aggregate incomes and disaster damages,
where the risks increase with income before they decrease
(Kellenberg and Mobarak 2008). The implication of this
view is that in addition to allocating resources to manage
disaster risk, the poorest nations may have to be more
proactive in enacting policies that alter those behavioral
choices of citizens that impact a country’s exposure to
natural disaster risk.
Similar issues are pertinent at the national level as well. If
it is actually true that catastrophic events such as hurricanes
further increase income inequality in affected areas, the
consequences are very important not only for policy makers
but also for insurance companies. Many low income families
do not have any property (primarily home) insurance. If the
impact burden of low income families increases following a
catastrophe, the government will be pressured to provide
both short- and long-term assistance to these families.
Likewise, fewer low income families will be in position
after a disaster to purchase insurance. This in turn will force
premiums for both existing and future home insurance pol-
icy buyers to further increase as the short-run insurance
industry supply curve of property insurance policies begins
to slope steadily upward (Gronn 1994). Hence determining
that hurricanes had (or alternatively did not have) an impact
on income distribution in affected states during the last
100 years should provide some direction and enable the
dialogue among all parties impacted by these events—fed-
eral and state government as a social planner, insurance
companies as profit-oriented enterprises, and people living
in these areas. Otherwise, the chances are that the conun-
drum of addressing the problems following future hurricane
devastations will be resolved on an ad hoc basis, as has so
often been the case in the past, thus furthering social divi-
sions and increasing social tensions.
The question of interest in this article is: are relatively
poorer people more likely to be impacted more severely by
catastrophic events? More specifically, we ask: do cata-
strophic events such as hurricanes impact the income dis-
tribution in the affected states of the United States, and, if
so, in what way? We are also interested in seeing if dif-
ferent regions (states) are impacted differentially by these
catastrophic events, and, if they are, why that is the case.
Strangely, although the United States experienced some of
the most severe hurricanes during the last century, there are
only a few studies that try to address this issue. Moreover,
these studies are case studies examine the impact of a
single catastrophic event (for example, hurricane) on the
affected area (West and Lenze 1994; Masozera et al. 2007).
As a more recent example, Masozera et al. (2007) exam-
ined whether neighborhoods in New Orleans were
impacted differently by Hurricane Katrina based on pre-
existing social, physical, and economic vulnerabilities.
They evaluate the degree to which the initial impacts of
Hurricane Katrina were distributed among the New
Orleans’ residents. Their findings suggest that preexisting
socioeconomic conditions play a significant role in the
ability of particular economic classes to respond immedi-
ately to the disaster and to cope successfully with its
aftermath. Their findings echo the perception and claims
made in the popular press (ABC News 2005; Moore 2012).
We study the more general impact of hurricane events on
income distribution at the state level in the coastal United
States based on historical data. In this way we create a
basis for a more general and less ad hoc approach that
addresses both policy and business aspects of the problem.
2 Literature Review
A large volume of literature focuses on natural disasters
with an increased interest in hurricanes. Most of these
studies are in areas of climate change, economic damage,
social science, socioeconomics, emergency management,
urban planning, and so on with a focus on specific geog-
raphies or hurricane events. While economic literature
deals with income distribution in general, there are very
few specific studies on how the overall state income dis-
tribution is affected by major hurricanes.
Masozera et al. (2007) found that preexisting socio-
economic conditions in New Orleans played a significant
role in the ability of particular economic classes to respond
to Hurricane Katrina and cope with it. Their analysis
showed that Hurricane Katrina caused severe damage in all
neighborhoods of New Orleans and that low-income people
were not likely to be harder hit by the physical events but
their lack of transportation and ability to recover faster
made them the most disadvantaged.
A report published by Logan (2006) on the impact of
Katrina suggests that the poor people suffered higher level
of damage due to the fact that higher percentage of poor
people lived in areas that sustained a higher level of
damage. In the region as a whole, it was found that the
disparities of damage were in line with the socioeconomic
conditions. The most damaged areas had 45.8 % of blacks,
20.9 % of households with income below the poverty level,
and 45.7 % of homes were occupied by renters. In
undamaged areas blacks represented 26.4 % of population,
15.3 % of people lived below the poverty level, and 30.9 %
of households were occupied by renters. Also smaller
resources are available to poor and black people so they are
less likely to return to their neighborhoods and rebuild.
Wealth and income effects of natural disasters were
analyzed by Guimaraes et al. (1992) in case of Hurricane
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Hugo, which struck South Carolina in September 1989. Due
to the infusion of billions of dollars from insurance and
public assistance, some sectors of South Carolina’s economy
surged during the reconstruction period following Hurricane
Hugo. Rebuilding efforts created a short-term boom before
the economy returned to normal growth. The most benefited
sectors included: construction, agriculture, agriculture and
trade, retail trade, transportation, and public utilities.
Several studies on income distribution are using the Gini
coefficient to measure income inequality but they focus on
specific areas of the United States or a natural disaster
(Brendler and Jones 1994; Madden 2000). For example, a
study of income distribution effect in the case of Hurricane
Katrina (Shaughnessy et al. 2010) identifies several theo-
retical models for modeling income distribution before and
after the disaster. Their best fitted model can be used to
estimate the Gini coefficient for the affected area as a
measure of income inequality. Their findings indicate a
decrease in income inequality from 0.5881(before Katrina)
to 0.5776 (after Katrina) and 0.5604 (in 2007) in New
Orleans in part due to an outflow of the poorest segment of
the population from the affected area.
Our study differs from those above in the sense that we
are using annual data on the Gini coefficient by state to
estimate the economic impact of hurricanes on the overall
state income distribution measured by the Gini coefficient.
We aim to predict the degree of income inequality based on
the intensity of hurricane economic damage and other
economic and demographic variables. Although one could
claim that it is difficult to separate wealth loss from income
loss, there are many influential studies showing a strong
positive correlation between wealth and permanent income
(for example, Hall 1978), or a close connection between
the consumption/income/wealth parallel (for example,
Carroll and Summers 1991; Carroll 1997), thus justifying
the use of income distribution in this study.
3 Data
This study uses a comprehensive panel of annual state level
data for the period 1910–2005. Selected variables include
Gini coefficient, gross domestic product (GDP), economic
damages from past hurricanes, the proportion of nonwhite
population, the proportion of population over age 60,
political control of the U.S. Senate, and the hurricane relief
funds released by the federal government to the affected
states. The states included in the study are the Atlantic
Coast states and the Gulf of Mexico states, since they are
generally considered the ‘‘hurricane’’ states. We recognize
that more micro-level data such as county-level data would
potentially be even more useful, but data for most variables
pertinent for this research are not available at that level.
There are several competing measures of income
inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, Theil entropy, and
Pietra measures of inequality. McDonald and Jensen
(1979) demonstrated that they all have advantages and
disadvantages, but are highly correlated and thus can be
used interchangeably. Hence the convenience of calculat-
ing the Gini coefficient played a major role in selecting it
as a measure of income inequality in this research. Gini
coefficient is defined as a measure of income inequality
with a value closer to one indicating more inequality. It is
calculated based on the Lorenz curve which is developed
by plotting the cumulative portion of the population on the
x-axis versus the cumulative portion of the total wealth/
income on the y-axis. The points on the curve show, for
example, that 20 % of all households may control 10 % of
the total income. In case of perfect income equality, every
person is assumed to have the same income which is rep-
resented by a straight line, y = x, called ‘‘the line of perfect
equality.’’ Perfect inequality would be a case when one
person has all the income and the rest has none. This
represents ‘‘the line of perfect inequality’’ constructed for
y = 0 % when x \ 100 and y = 100 % when x = 100 %.
If we denote the area between observed Lorenz curve and
‘‘the line of perfect equality’’ as Z1 and the area between
observed Lorenz curve and ‘‘the line of perfect inequality’’
by Z2, then the Gini coefficient is calculated as a ratio of
Z1/(Z1 ? Z2) (Milanovic 1997). Data for the Gini coeffi-
cient by state and year for the period 1916–2005 are
compiled by Frank (2008) based on the individual tax filing
data available from the Internal Revenue Service. For more
about the methodology by which the inequality measures
were constructed, refer to Frank (2008).
Pielke et al. (2008) published data on estimated nor-
malized economic damages in 2005 dollars related to
hurricanes by year and state for the period 1900–2005.
Economic damages are defined by Changnon (1996) as the
direct losses associated with a hurricane’s impact as
determined in the weeks immediately after the hurricane’s
landfall. Normalization refers to a method of estimating the
damages that would occur if a past hurricane made landfall
under a different year’s societal and economic conditions.
The normalized economic damages are estimated using
two different methods referred to as PL05 and CL05. The
PL05 method proposed by Pielke and Landsea (1999)
involves adjusting reported current year damages in dollars
by inflation, real wealth per capita, and coastal county
population growth. Collins and Lowe (2001) argued that in
many coastal states the amount of property exposed to
hurricanes has increased at a rate that exceeds local pop-
ulation growth because no effective planning limits were
enforced on construction in the hurricane flood hazard
zones. Thus the CL05 normalization method is proposed to
account for an adjustment to the number of coastal county
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housing units rather than the population. In this method, the
wealth adjustment accounts for the changes in housing
units—wealth per housing unit—rather than per capita. We
aggregated hurricane damages by year and state under the
two methods. There were no data on hurricane damages
available for the following coastal states: New Hampshire,
New Jersey, Maryland, and Delaware in either of our
sources as well as in the database of the National Hurricane
Center (NHC). None of the sources explain this lack of data
although it is clear that these states have been historically
impacted by the hurricanes.
Additional demographic data include the proportion of
people over age 60 and proportion of nonwhite population by
year and state as published by the (U.S. Census Bureau 2013).
These two variables are not included in the calculation of the
Gini coefficient, but they do reflect important changes in the
sociodemographic profile of the population of hurricane states
since the 1960s. We also explored data on hurricane relief
funds based on the government transfers reported by Con-
gressional Research Service Report for Congress (CRS 2008).
The values were adjusted to 2005 dollars but the data were
limited to the years from 1989 to 2008. In order to measure
economic growth by state over the same period we included
historical data on state GDP as provided by the (United States
Bureau of Economic Analysis 2013).
In the aftermath of hurricanes, it is not uncommon that
the government is put in a position to make some ad hoc
decisions about financial assistance provided to disaster
areas. Political affiliation of the President and party con-
trolling the Senate are not part of the calculation of the Gini
coefficient and as such are included in this analysis. Pop-
ular perception is that a specific political affiliation
(political parties) leads to differences in funding decisions.
Data on the political affiliation (Democratic versus
Republican) of the President, Senate, and House of Rep-
resentatives were obtained from Senate (United States
Senate 2013) and Congressional (United States House of
Representatives 2013) websites to test that hypothesis.
4 Methodology
We develop a panel-data model that focuses on the hurri-
cane states observed over the period 1910–2005. It is
postulated that the outcome variable, the Gini coefficient,
depends on explanatory variables such as hurricane dam-
ages, GDP; sociodemographic variables including propor-
tion of nonwhite people; political dominance of the U.S.
Senate; a set of cross-sectional dummy variables account-
ing for each of the study’s hurricane states; and time trend.
Other economic and sociodemographic variables such as
government transfers to the affected states through the
hurricane relief funds or the proportion of people aged 60
and above in total state population were also considered in
initial modeling efforts, but were later eliminated from the
model since they were not significant predictors of changes
in income distribution.
Our model is a fixed-effects model.
y ¼ alNT þ Xb þ Zll þ v ¼ Zd þ Zl þ v: ð1Þ
where y is NT 9 1, x is NT 9 K, Z = [lNTX], d0 = (a0, b0),
lNT is a vector of ones of dimension NT, and v is a vector of
stochastic disturbances independent and identically dis-
tributed IID(0, rv
2). Zl is the matrix of ones and zeroes, or
individual dummies representing individual states. The
reason to use a fixed-effects model instead of a simple
pooled model utilizing ordinary least squares (OLS) is the
possibility that omitted variables may lead to changes in
the cross section. Fixed-effects model, that is, models with
cross-sectional dummies only (such as in our model) or
including both cross-sectional and time-series dummies,
add dummy variables to allow for these changing intercepts
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998; Baltagi 1999). This proce-
dure is meaningful only if both intercept and slope are not
constant over cross-sectional units; if they are constant,
more efficient parameter estimates can be obtained by
combining all the data so that one large pooled regression
is run with NT observations. We have added (N - 1)
dummy variables to the model and have omitted the
remaining one, since their addition would result in perfect
collinearity among the explanatory variables. The dummy-
variable coefficients measure the change in the cross-sec-
tion intercepts with respect to the omitted state (Alabama
in our case). The decision to add dummy variables is also
made on the basis of statistical testing. The test involves a
comparison of the error sum of squares associated with the
two estimation techniques. Since the OLS model includes
more parameter restrictions than does the fixed-effects
model (the intercepts are restricted to be equal over states),
we would expect the error sum of squares to be higher for
the OLS model. If the increase in the error sum of squares
is not significant when the restrictions are added, we can
conclude that the restrictions are proper, and OLS can be
applied; otherwise, we choose the fixed-effects model.
F-test statistics are used with the null hypothesis being that
the equal-intercept restrictions are correct. Finally, it would
be ideal to convert these data into natural logarithms in
order to have the coefficients reported in the form of
elasticity, but numerous zeroes in PL05 and CL05 prevent
us from transforming the data.
5 Discussion of the Results
Econometric analysis was conducted in E-Views Version
6. A basic fixed-effects model measuring the impact of
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aggregate damages (PL05 and CL05) on the Gini coeffi-
cient along with cross-sectional dummies, time trend, and
the intercept was run for three distinct periods in order to
check for the robustness of the relationship between hur-
ricane damage and income distribution: 1916–2005
(Table 1), 1946–2005 (Table 2), and 1970–2005 (Table 3).
Results indicate the presence of a positive and statisti-
cally significant relationship between the PL05, CL05, and
Gini coefficient in all three cases, which confirms the
robustness (in a temporal sense) of this relationship. There
were no statistically significant differences observed
between the models containing CL05 relative to those with
PL05. The best full-fledged model including economic,
sociodemographic, and political variables has been esti-
mated for the period 1970–2005. Lack of data available for
some of the variables prevented us from estimating the
fully specified model for any longer time period.
The best model (Table 3) was selected based on both
minimized Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Sch-
warz criterion (SIC). Explanatory variables included in the
best model are GDP, PL05, percent of nonwhite popula-
tion, the political make-up of the U.S. Senate (Republican
versus Democratic), time trend, state-dummies (with
Alabama serving as the base/omitted state), and the inter-
cept. The cross-correlations among explanatory variables
are all below 0.4 indicating that no multicollinearity
problem exists. The difference between the coefficient of
determination (R-squared) and adjusted R-squared is very
small, which suggests very good model specification (that
is, no omitted or unnecessary variables in the model). The
value of the R-squared of 0.93 indicates a very good fit of
the data to the proposed model.
The value of the F-statistics indicates that we reject the
null hypothesis of cross-sectional dummies being jointly
equal to zero, that is, the fixed-effects model is superior to
simple pooling and OLS estimation. Finally, the value of
the Durbin–Watson statistic suggests that the model and
the data do not suffer from the serial correlation problem,
that is, the error terms from different time-series observa-
tions are not correlated.
The intercept value of 0.30 implies that the value of the
Gini coefficient would be 0.30 assuming no impact of other
variables on its value. Given that the Gini coefficient takes
values between 0 and 1, with higher number meaning there
is more income inequality, the value of 0.30 means that
‘‘natural’’ or ‘‘autonomous’’ income inequality is relatively
Table 1 Fixed-effect regression results for years 1916–2005
Variable Coefficient SE p-value




Time 0.000619 0.000531 0.2444
Connecticut 0.035532 0.005190 0.0000
Florida 0.045502 0.005260 0.0000
Georgia 0.011788 0.005192 0.0234
Louisiana 0.016826 0.005194 0.0012
Maine 0.009033 0.005194 0.0823
Massachusetts 0.025920 0.005197 0.0000
Mississippi 0.016491 0.005196 0.0015
New York 0.055246 0.005200 0.0000
North Carolina 0.013456 0.005215 0.0100
Rhode Island 0.021783 0.005205 0.0000
South Carolina -0.010354 0.005205 0.0469
Texas 0.026274 0.005211 0.0000
Virginia -0.000410 0.005211 0.9373
Effects specifications
R-squared 0.7216 Akaike info criterion -3.8497






0.0000 Durbin–Watson stat. 1.5268
Number of observations: 1,260
Table 2 Fixed-effects regression results for years 1946–2005
Variable Coefficient SE p-value




Time 0.002602 0.000451 0.0000
Connecticut 0.015426 0.002943 0.0000
Florida 0.035755 0.002993 0.0000
Georgia 0.010736 0.002944 0.0003
Louisiana 0.016587 0.002959 0.0000
Maine -0.011114 0.002947 0.0002
Massachusetts 0.002189 0.002950 0.4582
Mississippi 0.019765 0.002951 0.0000
New York 0.025770 0.002955 0.0000
North Carolina -0.002225 0.002971 0.4542
Rhode Island -0.010046 0.002957 0.0007
South Carolina -0.008737 0.002960 0.0033
Texas 0.035314 0.002969 0.0000
Virginia -0.003422 0.002966 0.2489
Effects specifications
R-squared 0.9339 Akaike info criterion -5.3755






0.0000 Durbin–Watson stat. 2.0768
Number of observations: 840
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low in the hurricane states of the United States. Indeed, that
is expected and logical considering that economic, social,
and political activities are geared towards changing
(improving) the relative socioeconomic status of more
influential interest groups compared to the rest of the
population (Becker 1983) hence leading to an increase in
the Gini coefficient. A positive time trend value suggests
that there is an autonomous increase in income inequality
over time with the Gini coefficient increasing by 0.004 per
year.
The gross domestic product measures national income
and output for a given country’s economy. GDP is equal to
the total expenditures for all final goods and services pro-
duced within the country in a stipulated period of time.
GDP in the United States was worth USD 15,684.80 billion
in 2012. If only the hurricane states included in this
research are considered, their GDP in 2005 equaled USD
5,080 billion in 2005, the last year included in the analysis.
The prevailing paradigm in the economics literature is that
with economic growth, as measured with an increase in
GDP, there is an increase in economic inequality. That is,
the poor become poorer in relative, and sometimes even in
absolute, terms (Ravallion and Chen 1997; Fields 2003).
Our result is consistent with that hypothesis, and the size of
the estimated coefficient is within the boundaries of what
one could expect. More specifically, an increase of annual
GDP in our sample of hurricane states by USD 1,000 bil-
lion (or 20 % of its 2005 value) would lead to an increase
in the Gini coefficient of 0.043 or 4.3 %. If we are to
reduce these numbers to values more likely to occur, a
USD 100 billion or 2 % increase in GDP would lead to an
increase in Gini coefficient of 0.43 %. This means that a
growth in national income leads to increase in inequality of
income distribution albeit that response is relatively
inelastic.
Our main interest is the impact of economic damage of
catastrophic hurricane events on income distribution in
hurricane states. An increase in normalized economic
damages, PL05, by USD 100 billion would lead to an
increase in the Gini coefficient of 0.054 or 5.4 %. For
illustration purposes, normalized economic damages for
the states under consideration in 2005 have been over USD
120 billion (Pielke et al. 2008) due to several damaging
hurricanes that happened that year including Katrina,
Wilma, Cindy, Rita, and Dennis. This result indicates that
hurricane damages are the single most important factor
impacting income distribution, that is, raising income
inequality in hurricane states. While the sign of the coef-
ficient was to some extent expected based on results of
some of the case studies (for example, Logan 2006), the
size of the coefficient is certainly very large. This has
potentially important implications for both policy makers
and the insurance industry. The sudden and irregular nature
of these catastrophic events makes the impact of each
individual event even more pronounced.
The only sociodemographic variable with significant
impact on income distribution in our model is the percentage
of nonwhite population in total population. As the nonwhite
population increases by 1 %, the Gini coefficient increases
by 0.054 or 5.4 %. Although this factor also has a large
impact, the process of demographic change is gradual
(unlike hurricane events) and could be planned for, pre-
dicted, and dealt with more easily by both policy makers and
the insurance sector. Based on data from the (United States
Bureau of Economic Analysis 2013), average salaries and
per capita income are higher for white than nonwhite pop-
ulation. Hence, as the proportion of nonwhite population in
the total population is expected to increase, this growth will
lead to a further increase in income inequality as measured
by the Gini coefficient and confirmed by our result.
The political party balance of the U.S. Senate also has
important implications on the income distribution. Our
Table 3 Best fixed-effects regression model results for years
1970–2005
Variable Coefficient SE p value
Intercept 0.304501 0.039826 0.0000
Time 0.004580 0.000917 0.0000




Nonwhite 0.053968 0.023795 0.0238
Senate 0.005485 0.002822 0.0525
Connecticut 0.032399 0.004786 0.0000
Florida 0.028139 0.005104 0.0000
Georgia 0.004529 0.003681 0.2192
Louisiana 0.018241 0.003795 0.0000
Maine 0.000848 0.006492 0.8961
Massachusetts 0.010375 0.006171 0.0934
Mississippi 0.013516 0.004556 0.0032
New York 0.006241 0.008487 0.4625
North Carolina -0.013376 0.003952 0.0008
Rhode Island 0.002358 0.004999 0.6517
South Carolina -0.012311 0.003750 0.0011
Texas 0.019528 0.006259 0.0019
Virginia -0.010253 0.004113 0.0130
Effects specifications
R-squared 0.9303 Akaike info criterion -5.4911






0.0000 Durbin–Watson stat. 2.3973
Number of observations: 504
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results indicate that the Gini coefficient increases by 0.005
or 0.5 % with a Democratic versus Republican Senate. At
first this appears a bit counterintuitive given the common
preconception of larger government (that is, more gov-
ernment taxing and spending) during Democratic control.
Yet, that result is consistent with leading public choice and
political economy models (for example, Ansolabehere and
Snyder 2006). These models suggest that counties and
states that traditionally give the highest vote share to the
governing party receive larger shares of state and federal
transfers to local and state governments. Hence although a
Democrat-dominated government may increase spending
relative to its Republican counterparts, these transfers do
not necessarily go into the hands of the neediest segment of
the population but rather are directed to the largest finan-
cial contributors and in turn exacerbate income inequality.
When we explored data on hurricane relief funds based on
the government transfers reported by Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress, we found that the
data are not a significant predictor of the income inequality
and as such are not further considered in the analysis.
The cross-sectional dummies indicate in most cases the
difference in intercepts across hurricane states relative to the
omitted/base state of Alabama. However, the size of these
coefficients is relatively small and vary from 0.032 (3.2 %)
for Connecticut to -0.013 for North Carolina (-1.3 %) in
the size of the Gini coefficient. This points to the socio-
economic, political, and demographic intricacies of indi-
vidual states not captured by other variables in the model.
6 Implications and Conclusions
Several economic, political, and sociodemographic variables
increase income inequality in U.S. Hurricane-exposed states.
But the key finding in this article is that economic damage
due to hurricane impacts further increases income inequality
in the hurricane states of the United States. This is true both
for the period from 1916 to 2005 and for several shorter
subperiods. Economic damage is defined here as the direct
losses associated with a hurricane’s impact as determined in
the weeks after the storm’s landfall. This result has very
important policy and insurance industry implications.
Both government and insurance industry consider hur-
ricanes to be an ‘‘act of God.’’ An ‘‘act of God’’ is a legal
term for events outside human control, such as hurricanes,
tornados, or other natural disasters for which no one can be
held responsible (Black 1990). In the law of contracts, an
act of God may be interpreted as an implied defense under
the rule of impossibility or impracticability. If so, the
promise is discharged because of unforeseen occurrences,
which were unavoidable and would result in insurmount-
able delay, expense, or other material breach (Black 1990).
While individual and small-scale instances of damage due
to natural disasters are typically not a government matter
and are settled through contracts between insurance com-
panies and their customers, large-scale catastrophic events
such as hurricanes create damage that often exceeds the
capacity of the insurance industry to handle without addi-
tional governmental involvement. The nature of events
such as hurricanes is a raison d’eˆtre for the very existence
of an insurance industry and yet one of the prime reasons
for its potential downfall.
The problem arises when a relatively poor segment of
the population inhabits high-exposure, high-risk areas of
the coastal United States. Many low income people are
unable to have their homes insured adequately (underin-
sured homes) or at all. Due to extremely high risk, insur-
ance companies are likely to charge disproportionally high
premiums in these areas. With every hurricane event, as
our results confirm, there is a growing gap between wealthy
and poor in these areas that further exacerbates the prob-
lem. Insurance companies can choose not to sell insurance
to the relatively poor segment of population or can decide
to charge very high premiums that cannot be afforded by
the relatively poor portion of the population. But both
strategies put government into peril since someone will,
eventually, have to provide assistance to the victims of
hurricane catastrophes.
In these situations, the insurance market itself is unlikely
to be economically efficient. Most often a competitive
market, without government intervention, is thought by
economic theorists to be the most economically efficient
system. An efficient market in this situation would imply
that the relatively low income population will be priced out
of the area by the insurance and construction industries.
But in this case it seems that government intervention can
increase the total welfare of consumers (home and business
owners) and producers (the insurance industry as a service
provider) in an otherwise competitive market. This is a
fairly standard case of market failure, where prices fail to
provide the proper signals to home owners and the insur-
ance industry. Moreover, the sociodemographic conse-
quences of a pure market mechanism are likely to be
viewed as discriminatory in today’s political climate.
Hence it seems necessary that there must be some mech-
anism agreed upon by the government (for example, sup-
plemental or base/minimum state insurance) and insurance
industry that would establish certain thresholds. These
basic agreements would have to establish two conditions.
They must enable profitable business operations for
insurance firms while not depleting state or federal budgets
excessively in the aftermath of damage associated with
hurricane events. At the same time any agreement would
have to maintain demographic diversity in these hazard-
prone areas.
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Such an effort has recently materialized in the form of a
law. Because private insurers rarely provide flood insurance,
the program is run by the federal government, which kept
premium rates artificially low in response to pressure from
the real estate industry and other groups. Recent legislation,
called the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of
2014, amends the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform
Act of 2012. The Biggert-Waters Act was supposed to
gradually restore the national flood insurance program to
solvency and encourage homeowners and communities to
undertake flood mitigation efforts in high hazard areas. But
it resulted in skyrocketing premiums for some property
owners thus pricing them out of the coastal, hurricane-prone
areas. This new legislation (United States Congress 2014)
ensures that homes in flood-prone areas will no longer be
subject to sharp increases in flood insurance premiums when
properties are sold or when a new flood map places them in
a higher-risk area. But people who live in older homes and
enjoy subsidized flood insurance rates could still see annual
increases in their premiums of up to 18 %. And all prop-
erties in high-risk areas will pay a new premium surcharge
of either USD 25 or USD 250 per year to help offset the cost
of the new bill. The bill, which was supported by the
National Association of Realtors, is intended to help revive
home sales in high-risk areas where uncertainty over flood
insurance premiums was reducing transactions by targeting
not only the more affluent portion of the population but also
middle class American homeowners. While this action
cannot be characterized as one that will lead to an
improvement in inequality, it has the potential to prevent a
further increase in income inequality.
Future research on this problem should focus on two
areas: state level analysis using county level data (data
availability permitting) and extending the data set to cap-
ture some most recent hurricane events such as Hurricane
Sandy. More micro-level studies could potentially account
for more intricacies and provide more information relevant
for local/state policy makers and insurance businesses.
Updating the existing data set is unlikely to change the
(statistical) findings if considered in a 100 year time
framework. But improvements in data quality would pro-
vide more confidence in the results of the study to potential
users of the results outside academia.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author(s) and the source are credited.
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